



**Director of  
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## **National Intelligence Daily**

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**EL SALVADOR: Military Developments**

*Guerrilla units are continuing military operations in the east and may be planning another attack on a departmental capital, while the Army remains largely on the defensive.* [REDACTED]

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The US defense attache says the high command believes that the guerrillas plan to attack the departmental capital of San Vicente. The Army notes that as many as 1,000 insurgents have returned to traditional base areas in the department and that insurgent resupply from coastal areas in Usulután may be increasing. [REDACTED]

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Meanwhile, most Army units are defending key installations throughout the country. Local operations in Cabanas and Cuscatlán were concluded over the weekend, and the defense attache has learned that an operation in southwestern Chalatenango is scheduled to begin on Monday. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** A successful attack against a departmental capital would give the insurgents an important military and psychological victory. The seizure of San Vicente, where the Army began the first phase of its combined military and civic action plan four months ago, would deal a particularly serious blow to the government's national campaign. [REDACTED]

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**UK: Labor Party Leader's Problems**

*New Labor Party leader Kinnock will have difficulty finding compromises acceptable to moderate and leftwing members.*

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Delegates to the party's annual conference shifted from advocating immediate withdrawal of the UK from the EC to citing withdrawal as one alternative. Labor still wants to cancel the Trident program and reject INF deployment. It supports inclusion of British nuclear forces in arms control negotiations and endorses a five-year timetable for removal of nuclear weapons from the UK.

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Party rules that will gradually increase the number of leftwingers in Labor's parliamentary delegation remain in place. Moreover, leftwingers are planning a campaign against initial INF deployments in the UK and will expect Kinnock to support them.

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**Comment:** Kinnock's views are farther to the left than those held by most of his recent predecessors. He has admitted, however, that many voters were alienated because Labor's policies appear extreme. He probably hopes to develop more widely acceptable positions.

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The new leader still believes in unilateral nuclear disarmament, and his campaign manager recently told US officials that he would not compromise on his goal of removing all nuclear weapons from the UK. Kinnock is likely to be flexible on the timing of unilateral steps as he deals with Labor's different factions in the four to five years before the next general election. He also probably will push for inclusion of British nuclear systems in some arms talks, an issue on which Labor is more united and on which Kinnock believes Prime Minister Thatcher is vulnerable.

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Kinnock's position as a unity candidate will be severely tested by the nuclear weapons issue. Open support for outright unilateral nuclear disarmament risks causing embarrassing disputes with his moderate deputy, Roy Hattersley, and could prompt some prominent moderates to refuse posts in Labor's shadow cabinet. A retreat on the issue, however, will cause an outcry on the left.

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**USSR-NICARAGUA: Delivery of Helicopter**

The US defense attache in Managua on Tuesday observed a truck convoy carrying what appeared to be MI-8 helicopter fuselage and rotor crates from the port of Corinto to Sandino International Airfield. The crates were marked "Ministry of Defense." The convoy was escorted by two trucks filled with troops.

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**Comment:** This is the fourth known or suspected delivery of an MI-8 this year. The Sandinistas now have some 10 of the troop-transport helicopters. About six are operational. The new helicopter probably will be assembled and tested at Sandino Airfield by Soviet specialists and then turned over to the Sandinista Air Force.

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**USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Attack on Soviet Embassy**

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[redacted] US Embassy sources report that the attacks cut off electricity to the Soviet buildings. [redacted]

**Comment:** Insurgent attacks on Soviet and Afghan Government facilities in Kabul have become more common since June. They appear to be part of a coordinated campaign of resistance in the capital area. The raids help raise the guerrillas' morale, demonstrate the regime's lack of control in Kabul, and attract international media attention. The continuing pressure against Kabul will force the Soviets to increase security operations in and around the city, thereby reducing the number of troops available to attack guerrillas in the countryside. [redacted]

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**USSR: Air Defense Commander Slighted**

Soviet media have ignored the 60th birthday of Marshal of Aviation Koldunov, Commander in Chief of Air Defense Forces. Commanders of branches of the armed forces are traditionally honored on this birthday, usually with an Order of Lenin medal. The media routinely report such awards within a day or two of the event. Moreover, Koldunov—unlike some of his staff members—has not made a public statement on the shootdown of the South Korean airliner by air defense forces under his command. [redacted]

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**Comment:** The silence surrounding the birthday and Koldunov's public reticence regarding the shootdown may indicate that he is the subject of criticism. Although the political leadership almost certainly is displeased with the performance of the air defense troops, it probably is reluctant to dismiss any high-ranking officer now. Such a move would amount to a public admission that a blunder was made. Koldunov could lose his job several months from now, however, after the leadership judges that international interest in the incident has declined. [redacted]

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**EAST GERMANY: Honecker on INF Countermeasures**

East German leader Honecker has warned again publicly that the Warsaw Pact will take "appropriate" countermeasures if NATO goes through with INF deployment. Honecker said in a media interview on Wednesday that such countermeasures would involve deployment of longer range tactical missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The official East German news service described Honecker's remarks on this issue as the most "precise" to date. [redacted]

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**Comment:** This is the most direct public allusion by any Warsaw Pact leader thus far to possible deployments in Eastern Europe of the SS-23 or perhaps the SS-12. The SS-23, a long anticipated replacement for the Scud, could be deployed this year. The SS-12 has been in service since 1965, but it has never been deployed outside the USSR. The Soviets might believe that the basing of the SS-12 in selected East European countries would pose a more credible response to NATO's INF missiles than the basing of the shorter range SS-23. [redacted]

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**DENMARK: Debate on INF**

Prime Minister Schlueter's center-right minority coalition government is likely to face increased demands from leftwing opposition parties this fall to oppose INF deployment. A parliamentary debate on INF is expected to take place late this month. The Socialist People's Party, which supported an anti-INF resolution in May, plans to push for a stronger condemnation of INF that will be difficult for the government to play down in NATO forums. The larger Social Democratic Party also opposes deployment. [redacted]

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**Comment:** The Social Democrats probably will not push the issue farther than they did in May because they are reluctant to force an election. Schlueter is likely to offer limited concessions to avoid an election that would weaken his smaller coalition members. The NATO Allies recognize that the Schlueter government is extremely vulnerable on the INF issue, but NATO will not welcome any additional slippage in Copenhagen's already weak support for the program. [redacted]

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**USSR: Publication of Plenum Proceedings**

Soviet media have announced the publication of a stenographic record of the Central Committee plenum in June. In addition to the report by Secretary Chernenko and the speech by General Secretary Andropov, it reportedly includes numerous previously unpublished speeches. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** The decision to resume publication of such records after a lapse of almost 20 years suggests that Andropov seeks to increase his visibility as party leader and appeal to broader circles in the party for support of his program. [REDACTED] the General Secretary took charge at the plenum and made several lengthy interruptions during party secretary Chernenko's report. Even an expurgated account of the plenum is likely to depict Andropov as playing the key role in the leadership. Recent press treatment of Andropov also has tended to play down "collective leadership."

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**NIGER: Coup Attempt Fails**

Forces loyal to Niger's pro-Western military regime put down a coup attempt yesterday while President Kountche was in France attending the annual French-African summit. Gunfire and troop movements were reported on Wednesday in Niamey, but the US Embassy says the capital is now calm and that some 1,100 US citizens are safe. No information is available thus far on the identities of the plotters. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** The coup attempt probably involved members of the military who are dissatisfied with Kountche's efforts to restore civilian rule and with economic austerity measures. The incident almost certainly will increase the President's concerns about subversive activities promoted by neighboring Libya, which claims large portions of Niger's uranium-rich north. Kountche—who has returned to Niamey—is likely to renew requests to the US and France for more economic and military aid to strengthen his hold on power and ensure that tentative moves toward civilian rule are not sidetracked. [REDACTED]

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## **Special Analysis**

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### **NATO: Disunity on British and French Missiles**

*Virtually all NATO members believe that the USSR's intransigence and insistence on including British and French nuclear forces in the INF talks is the most serious obstacle to an agreement on arms control. The Allies almost certainly will not yield to Soviet demands that those systems be taken into account at Geneva. They also are unlikely to delay INF deployments scheduled for December to seek a compromise with Moscow on this issue. The nonnuclear NATO governments, however, are being urged by their constituents to push for an INF agreement. As a result, they increasingly will demand that ways be found to overcome this obstacle.*

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The UK and France will continue to refuse to allow their forces to be the subject of negotiation in existing arms control forums. On the other hand, they are increasingly sensitive to Allied pressure to moderate their position. London and Paris are searching for ways to demonstrate flexibility to the public on this issue while preserving the independence of their deterrent forces and proceeding with their nuclear modernization programs.

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Opposition parties and leaders on the left in West Germany, the UK, Norway, and Denmark all have stated that French and British nuclear forces should be subject to arms control. The Dutch Prime Minister publicly maintains that all nuclear forces should be taken into account in some negotiations, and the parliament recently reaffirmed this position.

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### **Thatcher Remains Firm**

Prime Minister Thatcher's exclusion of British forces from existing arms control talks enjoys considerable Conservative Party support, and she is unlikely to alter her position any time soon. The US Embassy reports, however, that British officials are being urged by

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the West Germans, Italians, and other Allies to adopt a more flexible position. The British are considering a range of possibilities, including a unilateral statement linking the size of their forces to US and Soviet strategic force reductions in a future START agreement. [REDACTED]

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The Labor Party and the Social Democratic Party-Liberal Party alliance continue to endorse the inclusion of British forces in the arms control process. Officials in London are concerned that domestic pressure could eventually strengthen opposition to the already controversial modernization of British forces with new ballistic missile submarines armed with MIRVed Trident D-5 missiles. [REDACTED]

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### **France Holds the Line**

The French Government and press continue to react strongly to any suggestion that France's strategic forces should be accounted for in an arms control agreement. The French remain concerned, however, that the US will agree to Soviet demands for compensation out of impatience with the stalemate in Geneva or in response to pressure from other Allies. French officials also reportedly fear that London's inability to justify the large number of Trident warheads will cause the UK to abandon its position, including resistance to coverage of its forces in INF or START. [REDACTED]

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To counteract growing demands for changes in the French position, President Mitterrand recently outlined at the UN the conditions under which France would consider participation in arms control negotiations. It would require substantial reductions in Soviet strategic forces, reaffirmation of restrictions on ballistic missile defense, and progress in control of conventional forces and chemical weapons. Mitterrand also suggested that any such negotiations should take the form of a five-power conference that would include China. [REDACTED]

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### **Outlook**

After INF deployments begin, the basing countries probably will put more pressure on the US to find some compromise with the USSR on British and French systems. They will be especially concerned if Moscow suspends negotiations and makes concessions on this issue a precondition for resuming them. Some basing countries may argue that, as long as this issue remains unresolved, it will continue to complicate the INF deployment process. [REDACTED]

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The Allies probably see a number of ways to deal with the issue of compensating for British and French systems. They almost certainly want the INF negotiations to be combined with strategic arms talks next year, and they are likely to urge the US, UK, and France to find a formula for including third-country forces. A West German official recently suggested a five-power conference similar to the Washington Naval Conference of 1922. [REDACTED]

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A proposal for such a conference probably would be welcomed by the Allies, particularly if it were coordinated with them first and if it reinforced the linkage between European security and the US nuclear guarantee. The Allies presumably recognize, however, that Mitterrand's conditions would be difficult to meet. They therefore may push the US to agree to search for ways to compensate for British and French missiles in bilateral talks with the USSR. [REDACTED]

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West European newspapers already have speculated that the recent US offer not to match SS-20 deployments in the Soviet Far East with INF missiles in Western Europe could be a form of compensating for third-country forces. Government officials may want to explore this approach, and some also may want eventually to allow the USSR some numerical advantage in European-based INF as a more direct form of compensation. [REDACTED]

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The British and especially the French are acutely sensitive to these negotiating nuances. The US Embassy in Paris reports that French officials already are concerned that the regional limitations included in the new US INF initiative represent a first step toward compensation for British and French forces. Suspicion by the French and British that the US is willing to enter into an arms control agreement that includes compensation for Anglo-French nuclear forces could cause them to mistrust US intentions and could jeopardize growing French cooperation with NATO. [REDACTED]

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The US would find itself in the middle of a dispute between NATO's nuclear powers and some nonnuclear members. The UK and France would expect steadfast US support in protecting their nuclear forces from negotiations. The others would want Washington to compromise on this issue to reach an arms control agreement. [REDACTED]

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